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I.  BACKGROUND1 
In the social world as we know it, two of the most salient dimensions of human 
difference are race and gender.  If I mention that I met an interesting person 
while waiting for the subway last week, a first step to understanding the nature 
of our contact would be to identify whether the person was a man or a woman, 
and what race they were.  (Also especially useful would be their relative age.) 
To describe someone by their race and gender is not simply to describe their 
appearance, but to situate them in a framework of meaning and indicate the 
social norms that govern our interactions.
Drawing on the insight that one’s sex has quite well-defined and systematic 
social implications, feminists have argued that it is helpful to distinguish sex 
and gender.  Very roughly, as the slogan goes, gender is the social meaning of 
sex.  The idea is that gender is not a classification scheme based simply on 
anatomical or  biological differences, but marks social differences between 
individuals.  Sex differences are about testicles and ovaries, the penis and 
the uterus (and on some theories, quite a bit more (Money and Tucker 1975, 
Fausto-Sterling 2000))2 ; gender, in contrast, is a classification of individuals 
in terms of their social position, as determined by interpretations of their sex.
To help understand this, consider, for example, the category of landlords. 
To be a landlord one must be located within a broad system of social and 
economic relations which includes tenants, private property, and the like. It 
might have been that all and only landlords had only four toes on their left 
foot.  But even if this were the case, having this physical mark is not what it 
is to be a landlord.  Being nine-toed is an anatomical kind; being a landlord 
is a social kind.  Similarly, we can draw a distinction between sex and gender: 
sex is an anatomical distinction based on locally salient sexual/reproductive 
differences, and gender is a distinction between the social/political positions 
of those with bodies marked as of different sexes. (See also Haslanger 1993.)
To be clear, I’ll use the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ to designate sexes, ‘man’ 
and ‘woman’ to designate genders.3   Because one is a female by virtue of some 
(variable) set of anatomical features, and one is a woman by virtue of one’s 
position within a social and economic system, we should allow, at least in 
principle, that some males are women and some females are men.  Although 
it is clear enough for our purposes here what distinguishes males and females, 
the question of what it is to be a man or woman is not at all clear.  And this 
has been a major site of controversy amongst feminists.
I’ll return to how we might define gender shortly.  In the meantime it is 
interesting to note that there is a parallel to the sex/gender distinction in the 
case of race.  Just as one’s primary and secondary sex characteristics are socially 
meaningful, so are the color of one’s skin, shape of one’s eyelids, color and texture 
of one’s hair, etc.  So we can distinguish the physical markers of race from the 
social implications that these markers have.  To register this terminologically, 
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let’s distinguish “color” and “race” as parallel to sex and gender.   I will use 
the term ‘color’ to refer to the (contextually variable) physical “markers” of 
race, just as I use the term ‘sex’ to refer to the (contextually variable) physical 
“markers” of gender.  I mean to include in “color” more than just skin tone: 
common markers also include eye, nose, and lip shape, hair texture, physique, 
etc.  And in principle I want to allow that virtually any cluster of physical traits 
that are assumed to be inherited from those who occupy a specific geographical 
region or regions can count as “color”. (Although the term ‘people of color’ is 
used to refer to non-Whites, I want to allow that the markers of “Whiteness” 
count as “color”.)  Borrowing the slogan we used before, we can say then that 
race is the social meaning of “color”.
So far I’ve characterized race and gender very vaguely.  It is one thing to say 
that race and gender are social categories that capture the social implications 
of certain bodily traits, but can we give them more content?  For example, 
what are the specific social implications of sex in terms of which we should 
define gender?  
Among feminist theorists there are two problems that have generated 
pessimism about providing any unified account of women; I’ll call them the 
commonality problem and the normativity problem. Very briefly, the commonality 
problem questions whether there is anything social that females have in com-
mon that could count as their “gender”.  If we consider all females—females of 
different times, places, and cultures—-there are reasons to doubt that there is 
anything beyond body type (if even that) that they all share (Spelman 1988).  
The normativity problem raises the concern that any definition of “what woman 
is,” because it must select amongst the broad variation in women’s traits, can-
not help but be value-laden, and so will marginalize certain females, privilege 
others, and reinforce current gender norms (Butler 1990, Ch. 1).
A primary concern of feminist and antiracist theorizing is to give an account 
of the social world that will assist us in the struggle for justice.  Given this goal, 
I take the primary motivation for distinguishing sex from gender to arise in 
the recognition that societies, on the whole, privilege individuals with male 
bodies.   Although the particular forms and mechanisms of oppression vary 
from culture to culture, societies have found many ways—some ingenious, 
some crude—to control and exploit the sexual and reproductive capacities of 
females.   So one important strategy for defining gender has been to analyze 
it in terms of women’s subordinate position in systems of male dominance.4  
Recognizing the legitimate goals of feminist and antiracist theory, we can al-
low, then, that certain values guide our inquiry.  Pursuing this line of thought, 
here is a (rough) proposal for specifying what it is to be a man or a woman:5 
S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimen-
sion (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as 
a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features 
presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.6 
S is a man iffdf S is systematically privileged along some dimension 
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(economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is “marked” as a target 
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed 
to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction.
It is a virtue, I believe, of these accounts, that depending on context, one’s 
sex may have a very different meaning and it may position one in very different 
kinds of hierarchies.  The variation will clearly occur from culture to culture 
(and sub-culture to sub-culture); so e.g., to be a Chinese woman of the 1790’s, 
a Brazilian woman of the 1890’s, or an American woman of the 1990’s may 
involve very different social relations, and very different kinds of oppression. 
Yet on the analysis suggested, these groups count as women insofar as their 
subordinate positions are marked and justified by reference to female sex.
With this strategy of defining gender in mind, we can now consider whether 
it will help  in giving some content to the social category of race. The femi-
nist approach recommends: don’t look for an analysis that assumes that the 
category’s meaning is always and everywhere the same; rather, consider how 
members of the group are socially positioned, and what physical markers serve as 
a supposed basis for such treatment.   Elaborating the earlier slogan, we might 
say that race is the social meaning of the geographically marked, i.e., “colored” 
body. To develop this, consider the following account.7 
A group is racialized (in context C) iffdf its members are socially 
positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.) (in C), and the group is 
“marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a 
certain geographical region.
In other words, races are those groups demarcated by the geographical as-
sociations accompanying perceived body type, when those associations take 
on evaluative significance concerning how members of the group should be 
viewed and treated. Given this definition, we can say that S is of the White 
(Black, Asian...) race [in C] iff Whites (Blacks, Asians...) are a racialized group 
[in C], and S is a member.8    
Note that on this view, whether a group is racialized, and so how and whether 
an individual is raced, is not an absolute fact, but will depend on context.  For 
example, Blacks, Whites, Asians, Native Americans, are currently racialized 
in the US insofar as these are all groups defined in terms of physical features 
associated with places of origin, and insofar as membership in the group func-
tions socially as a basis for evaluation.  However, some groups are not currently 
racialized in the US, but have been so in the past and possibly could be again 
(and in other contexts are), e.g., the Italians, the Germans, the Irish.
Given these accounts it should be clear that a primary task in the quest for 
social justice is to eliminate those social structures that constitute races (or 
racialized groups) and eliminate men and women.  Of course this is not to say 
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that we should eliminate males and females, or impose a “khaki” appearance 
on everyone.  Rather, it is to say that we should work  for a day when sex and 
“color” markers do not have hierarchical implications.
II.  ALTERNATIVES
At this stage one might reasonably ask, however: Why build hierarchy into 
the definitions?  Why not define gender and race as those social positions 
motivated and justified by cultural responses to the body, without requiring 
that the social positions are hierarchical?  Wouldn’t that provide what we need 
without implying (implausibly) that women are, by definition, subordinate, men, 
by definition, privileged, and races, by definition, hierarchically positioned?
Recall the suggestion that gender is the social meaning of sex and race is 
the social meaning of “color”.  Consistent with this, one could allow that the 
social implications of sex and “color” are, as we know them, hierarchical, but 
insist that sex and “color” can nonetheless be meaningful under conditions of 
justice.  If so, then in envisioning a just future we should include the option 
of preserving race and gender while working towards race and gender equality.
Pursuing this strategy we could use the definitions of man and woman  offered 
above: it is clear that these dominant nodes of our current gender structures are 
hierarchical.  But rather than assuming that gender is simply the genus under 
which the more specific categories of men and women fall, we could define 
gender as a broader genus allowing both hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
cases.  For example (roughly), 
A group G is a gender  (in context C) iffdf its members are similarly 
positioned as along some social dimension (economic, political, legal, 
social, etc.) (in C), and the members are “marked” as appropriately 
in this position by observed or imagined bodily features presumed 
to be evidence of reproductive capacities or function.
A similar approach to race would yield the following: 
A group G is racialized (in context C) iffdf its members are similarly 
positioned as along some social dimension (economic, political, legal, 
social, etc.) (in C), and the members are “marked” as appropriately 
in this position by observed or imagined bodily features presumed 
to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region.
As in the case of gender, we could retain the hierarchical analysis for existing 
races, e.g., Black, White, Latina/o, etc., are hierarchical groups.  But we might 
envision a new egalitarian structure of races, i.e., new races, to take their place.
In what follows, I will argue that there are interesting and important dif-
ferences between race and gender that count against treating them as parallel. 
Because sex is, from a political point of view, inevitably meaningful, we need 
to envision new egalitarian genders; but race is different, and we should not 
5
Haslanger: Future Genders? Future Races?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2004
6 x 9
Future Genders?  Future Races?     9
take a parallel approach to race.  
III. “SEX”, “COLOR” AND BIOLOGY
Start with gender.  I am sympathetic to radical rethinkings of sex and gender. 
In particular, I believe that we should refuse to use anatomy as a primary basis 
for classifying individuals and that any distinctions between kinds of sexual 
and reproductive bodies are importantly political and open to contest.  Some 
authors have argued that we should acknowledge the continuum of anatom-
ical differences and recognize at least five sexes (Fausto-Sterling 1993).  And 
if sexual distinctions become more complex, we would also need to rethink 
sexuality, given that sexual desire would not fit neatly within existing homo-
sexual/heterosexual paradigms.  
However, one can encourage the proliferation of sexual and reproductive 
options without maintaining that we can or should eliminate all social impli-
cations of anatomical sex and reproduction.  Given that as a species there are 
substantial differences in what human bodies contribute to reproduction, and 
what sorts of bodies bear the main physical burdens of reproduction, and given 
further that reproduction cannot really help but be a socially significant fact 
(it does, after all, produce children), it can seem difficult to imagine a func-
tioning society, more specifically, a functioning feminist society, that doesn’t 
acknowledge in some way the difference between those kinds of bodies that 
are likely able to bear children, and those that aren’t.  One could argue that 
we should work towards a society free of gender in a materialist sense—one 
in which sex-oppression does not exist—while still allowing that sexual and 
reproductive differences should be taken into account in a just society. (Frye 
1996; Gatens 1996.)
The argument just sketched (more is certainly needed to flesh it out)  as-
serted that sexual difference—allowing variations in what cultures consider or 
should consider relevant in marking sex differences—would be in some way 
meaningful in any society of people with bodies like ours, at least in any society 
in which humans are sexual beings and reproduce biologically; so doing away 
with gender categories altogether, i.e., eliminating social categories that take 
sexual difference into account, would not be an effective way to create a just 
future.   On this issue I am sympathetic to Beauvoir’s argument that females, 
on the whole, bear a greater physical burden for the species than males, and 
it is the responsibility of society to address this in order to achieve justice 
(Beauvoir 1989/1949, Ch. 2).  
So instead of attempting to eliminate gender, we should try to envision new 
non-oppressive ways of being gendered without being a man or a woman, and 
should eventually incorporate these new gender concepts as parts (possibly 
very small parts) of our self-understandings.  In other words, in a just society 
gender  (in some as yet unknown form) should constitute a thin social position, 
and to the extent that one’s social position has an impact on one’s “identity,” 
we should allow for the development of non-hierarchically grounded gender 
identities.9   Consequently, it is an important project within a feminist anti-
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racism to construct alternative social positions and identities (hopefully many 
of them!) for people of different sexes.10  
The idea here is that justice requires that we radically rethink the structure 
of relationships that constitute our societies.  But this does not mean that 
“anything goes”.  There are some limits to what  alternatives are viable, e.g., 
there may be features that are necessary for the society to function at all, or 
for it to be just, or that are especially desirable in some way.   Sexual reproduc-
tion, I submit, imposes some limits in forming a just society, though it is not 
clear what those limits are.   Given that sex needs to be meaningful in order 
to achieve justice, a conception of gender that allows new non-hierarchical 
cases will be valuable in our efforts.
The question arises, however, whether there is something about race that 
should also constrain us.  Is there something significant we are in danger of 
losing track of should we pursue the elimination of race?11   It would seem that 
racial equality should be our goal (as opposed to the elimination of race), only if 
we have reason to view “color” as a justifiable way for societies to differentiate 
groups of people, i.e., if “color” is a legitimate basis for a thin social position. 
Although it appears that there are reasons for any functioning society to take 
sex and reproduction seriously, there does not seem to be any comparable 
reason for thinking that functional societies must acknowledge those physi-
cal differences that distinguish “color”.  Classifications based on “color” vary 
tremendously depending on the socio-historical-legal context, and are not 
grounded in meaningful biological categories.  (Appiah 1992, Ch. 2; Appiah 
1996;  Root 2000; Mills 1998, Ch 3; Zack 2002; Lewontin 1982; cf. Mosely 
1995; Kitcher 1999; Andreason1998; Andreason 2000).12   For example, the 
markers of “Blackness” differ when considering, e.g., the contemporary United 
States, Brazil, and South Africa, and the rules for racial marking change over 
time (Davis 1991).   Moreover, “color” classification is not just an informal 
practice, but is often legally imposed and based on biological myths of “blood” 
(think of the “one drop” rule, enforced under Jim Crow).   It is not plausible 
to explain the variation and development of “color”  distinctions in terms of 
increased understanding of biology or genetics.  Rather, the best explanations 
point to their social and political implications (Fields 1982; Fields 1990; 
Stocking 1994; Mills 1997).   
These facts indicate an important difference between race and gender.  Al-
though gender as we know it is a site of social injustice, just societies should be 
concerned with those functions of human bodies that matter for reproduction. 
But “color”–those clusters of  features such as skin tone, hair texture, eye and 
lip shape, imagined “racial gene”, and other imagined anatomical differences 
that are used to mark races—does not seem to correlate with any feature that 
carries sufficient biological weight that it must be socially addressed.
It is important to note that even if society should not be structured to rec-
ognize “color”-distinctions, this does not entail a politics of “race blindness”. 
Race, as I’ve argued, is more than just “color”; it concerns the systematic sub-
ordination of groups of people marked by “color”.13   The effort to end racism 
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must recognize racialized groups in order to understand the processes by which 
they are formed and sustained, and in order to remedy the ongoing injustice 
done to their members.  Recognizing racialized groups is not only compatible 
with justice but essential to achieving it.   But to recognize the social positions 
created by existing racist ideologies and institutions is not to endorse the for-
mation of public or personal identities based on “color”.  
For example, in the contemporary US, there are many groups that define 
themselves by reference to race and racial injustice: some form on the basis of 
a common history of racial oppression, or in solidarity against such oppression, 
others on the basis of cultural practices that have evolved within racialized 
groups (e.g., Kwanzaa).  However, note that it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for group membership that one have a particular inherited body type per se; 
what is required is a common history, a moral stand against injustice, or the 
enjoyment of a celebratory practice.   These groups, or at least many of them, 
do not define themselves by reference to “color”, even if in the context of racial 
oppression some of them  correspond in their membership roughly to groups 
that are marked by “color”.  Such group conceptions avoid false assumptions 
about biology and geography in constructing group solidarity, and also avoid the 
entrenchment of social divisions along existing racial lines: at least in principle 
and often in practice, the membership of such groups is “multi-racial” by the 
dominant standards of racialization.   
A.  The medical necessity of “color” coding
But perhaps this is too fast.  What about racial patterns in susceptibility to 
disease?  Shouldn’t societies be prepared, as a matter of justice, to address 
disadvantages that some suffer due to genetic risk factors?  And don’t some 
of these correlate with “color”?  The weight of current research suggests not 
(Root 2001).  Although there are significant generalizations linking race/”-
color” with disease in the United States, the basis for these generalizations is 
social not biological: 
Blacks are seven times more likely to die of tuberculosis than whites, 
three times more likely to die of H.I.V.-A.I.D.S. and twice as likely to 
die of diabetes.  The diseases are biological but the racial differences 
are not; How is this possible? …No mystery.  Race affects income, 
housing, and healthcare, and these, in turn, affect health.  Stress 
suppresses the immune system and being black in the U.S. today is 
stressful.  (Root 2000, S629)
Given the contextual variability of “color” classifications, it is not surpris-
ing that generalizations linking “color” with disease are only local and do not 
support a biological basis for race.  For example, 
An individual with sickle-cell disease can be black in the U.S., but 
white in Brazil, for the category of black or white is defined differently 
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here and there.  As a result, rates of sickle-cell disease for blacks 
differ from place to place, in part because race does.  (Root 2000).
Thus, it seems that although there are reasons for a society to take “color” 
seriously as an indicator of risk under conditions where groups are racialized (or 
are suffering the long-term effects of racialization), this only shows that prior 
injustice imposes  constraints on the construction of a just society; it does not 
show that “color”, or a biological fact correlating with “color”, imposes such a 
constraint.   As a result it may be appropriate for societies to be structured so 
that there are social implications of having suffered injustice—implications 
that attempt to redress the injustice or prevent recurring injustice—but history 
rather than biology is what requires our response.   
On might insist, however, that although we currently think of “color” as 
something that is easily observable in everyday interaction, perhaps instead it 
should be genetically defined.  If so, then in keeping with the terminology I’ve 
introduced, the genetic traits in question would count as “color”.  And to be 
more explicit, we might adjust our slogan for race: race is the social  meaning 
of certain (to be specified) genetic traits.   
In pursuing this approach, we cannot assume that such genetically defined 
groups will correspond with the groups we currently count as races, i.e., that the 
external appearance  of the groups will correspond to the “color” divisions we 
make now, or even that the external appearance of members of a single group 
will be similar.  But that’s just to say, on this view, that our current classification 
is misguided.  Moreover, one might argue, we need to treat such genetic groups 
as socially relevant because they correlate with socially meaningful traits, e.g., 
susceptibility to disease.  Because medical care is something that a just society 
must be concerned to provide, “color”, like sex, must be taken into account 
even under conditions of justice.  As a result, we should treat race like gender 
as a category that currently has hierarchical forms, but need not.
The question whether there are genetically defined groups that are med-
ically significant  and should count as races is a large issue in contemporary 
genomics and biomedical ethics.  I will not be in a position to address fully 
the literature on this topic here.  However, there are three points that count 
against  revising my account of race to include non-hierarchical groups defined 
by reference to genetic traits.  
First, according to my definition, racial divisions are marked by observed 
or imagined clusters of physical traits that are assumed to be inherited from those 
who occupy a specific geographical region or regions. Consequently, not just any 
medically relevant genetic division amongst humans will count as a basis for 
race: the genetic traits must be interpreted as geographically significant.  The 
connection between race and geography is, I believe, a key factor in distinguish-
ing race from other social categories that are marked on the body and assumed 
to be natural, e.g., gender, certain forms of disability and disease, (sometimes) 
sexual orientation, and (sometimes) caste.  The link with geography also helps 
explain the role of racial concepts in the context of imperialism and the process 
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of nation-building (Mills 1997).  So there are good reasons to maintain the 
geographical element in the definition of race.
Second, although my definition of “color” does not require that the physical 
traits in question be easily observable in ordinary interaction, the marking of 
racialized bodies involves appearance.  For example, at certain times and places, 
Jews have been racialized.  The specifics of the racialization process vary, but 
on one scenario Jews are imagined to have some physical feature inherited 
from populations originating in what is now the Middle East.  In some cases, 
however, it is recognized that there is no reliably observable physical feature 
that distinguishes Jews from non-Jews, so other devices have been introduced 
to make sure that their race is identifiable in casual encounters, e.g., yellow 
stars.  So even if geneticists can find ways of dividing humans into groups 
based on genetic features that are assumed to be inherited from populations 
originating in a particular region, as I see it, those groups are racialized in a 
context only if in that context it is thought that there are observable markers, 
either anatomical or artificial, that—at least in paradigm cases—distinguish 
members of the group.   Such observable marking is important to the process 
of racialization, for a key factor in racializing a group is the invocation of so-
cial norms that differentiate “appropriate” behavior towards the members of 
the group (normally) before any interaction is possible.  You experience the 
“color,” behave in accordance with the norms for individuals of that kind, and 
ask questions later, if ever (Alcoff 2000a, Alcoff 2000b).
Granting these two points, it would seem that it is still possible for races, 
in my sense, to be constituted by social responses to genetic facts.   A genetic 
division amongst humans, together with assumptions concerning geography 
and practices of marking, can  create social groups which are either privileged 
and subordinated.  In other words, it is possible for genetics to function as an 
element of “color” in a process of racialization.  However, the question now 
before us is whether there are good reasons to count non-hierarchical groups 
constituted in this way as races.   Is “color” genuinely analogous to “sex” or not? 
(Recall, I’ve suggested there is good reason to treat differently sexed bodies 
differently even under conditions of justice.)
For example, consider those who have a genetic susceptibility to sickle 
cell anemia.  Although it is often thought that sickle cell is a “Black disease”, 
the “color” designation “black” does not correlate at all well with those who 
have the relevant gene (HbS), or with those who have the disease.   (I’ll use 
the capitalized term ‘Black’ for the racialized group;  I’ll use lower-case ‘black’ 
for the body schema designated for those with relatively recent sub-Saharan 
African ancestry.)  Sickle cell is found primarily among populations whose 
ancestors have lived where malaria is common.  So it occurs among those with 
ancestors from central and western Africa, but not southern Africa; it is also 
found, e.g., in Turks, Yemenis, Indians, Greeks, and Sicilians (Adelman 2003). 
Should we treat carriers of the sickle cell gene as a group whose geno-
type-plus-geographical origins is relevant in structuring a just society?  Given 
that presumably justice requires that we treat HbS carriers as a morally sig-
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nificant group (they should be entitled to certain medical care, perhaps to 
health education concerning reproductive options, accommodation for any 
resulting disabilities, etc.), it appears that  “color” features do matter in set-
ting constraints on how we organize ourselves.  In order to guarantee needed 
accommodation HbS carriers might also be “marked” by health alert bracelets 
or necklaces (note that I’m not recommending this, but raise it to make a 
more exact analogy with race).  If so, then it would seem that the disanalogy 
between sex and “color” breaks down.  
But this leads to my third point against treating non-hierarchical genet-
ic-cum-geographical groups as racial groups.  Insofar as justice requires that we 
accommodate the needs of such a group, it is by virtue of their health status. 
Of course, medical conditions are relevant in considering what justice requires, 
and it may be that medical conditions sometimes correlate with geographi-
cal origins (for obvious cases think of children born or brought up in highly 
polluted areas).  But the basis for the differential treatment in these cases is 
the medical condition; any real or imagined links with geography is, from the 
medical point of view, accidental.  For example, suppose a large percentage of 
individuals born in a certain area have a specific genetic defect.  Presumably an 
individual born in or with ancestors from a very different area with the same 
genetic defect should be grouped with them from the medical point of view.   
As I see it, the main issue is how we draw distinctions between humans 
for the purposes of justice.  I’ve argued that it is important to distinguish 
existing races and genders because of historical and contemporary forms of 
oppression; I’ve argued that we should distinguish new forms of gender in 
order to accommodate the special burdens some humans carry in the process 
of reproduction; I have also suggested that we should distinguish groups with 
respect to medical conditions in order to provide adequate care and support. 
These different categories of concern require different strategies of response. 
Although there are cases where the genetics, geography, and marking relevant 
to medicine can trigger racialization, I submit that this is when hierarchy is 
imposed.  In effect, there will be cases in which  racism and ableism overlap 
and in which antiracists and antiableists are confronting structurally similar 
injustice.  However, for the most part, the challenges facing those who have 
suffered racial injustice and those who have suffered medical/ableist injustice 
are very different; and race and disability require different responses in order to 
achieve justice.  This provides good reason for not expanding the definition of 
race to include non-hierarchical genetic divisions between us as racial divisions.
 
B.  Evolution, populations, and life-worlds
But perhaps there are other biological explanations of the persistence of 
race.  Lucius Outlaw provides further reason to pause before we reject “color” 
as a legitimate, perhaps even inevitable, source of social meaning.  He asks, 
concerning the number and persistence of differently “colored” populations, 
Might these populations not be the result of bio-cultural group 
attachments and practices that are conducive to human survival 11
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and well-being, and hence must be understood, appreciated, and 
provided for in the principles and practices of, say, a liberal demo-
cratic society?   (Outlaw 1996, 13)
He seems to answer that populations defined at least in part by “color” 
are valuable and virtually inevitable. Communities, he argues, constitute 
“life-worlds” of meaning which include interpretations of the body.   “... of 
particular importance,” he points out, “are norms of somatic aesthetics that 
help to regulate the preferences and practices in terms of which partners are 
chosen for the intimacies that frequently (must) result in the birth of new 
members…” (Outlaw 1996, 16) 
Because, he argues, humans on the whole desire “to achieve relative 
immortality” by having offspring “who look and carry on somewhat like our-
selves” (Outlaw 1996, 17),14  moreover, because we have reason to be fearful 
of “significantly different and objectionable strangers” (Outlaw 1996, 17), and 
finally, because the “valorization of descent” increases our chances of survival 
by motivating cooperation (Outlaw 1996, 18),  our communities develop into 
“self-reproducing populations that share distinguishing physical and cultural 
features that set the demographic boundaries of a life-world.” (Outlaw 1996, 
17)  On his view, when such a population is defined to a significant degree 
by physiological factors, it is a race; when to a lesser degree, it is an ethnicity. 
(Outlaw 1996, 136).  Races are, then, enduring, if not inevitable, facts of 
social life, and because they promote cooperation, security, and so survival of 
a community’s life-world, they are valuable.
Although I am sympathetic to Outlaw’s interest in the embodiment of social 
norms and the development of an aesthetic of “color” (see, e.g., Haslanger 2004), 
there are a number of points in this narrative that strike me as worrisome.  In 
particular, I wonder about the implicit gender assumptions and the supposed 
“naturalness” of mate selection among humans.  For example, it appears that 
Outlaw is taking as given that individuals tend to choose mates of the same 
“color” (allowing that “color” differences depend on context), and the task is 
to provide an explanation of this that will show such choices to be conducive 
to the survival of their society.  There are potentially two connections with 
biology here: on one hand, individual choices for “same-color” mates are being 
cast as, although admittedly shaped by cultural cues, nonetheless “natural”; 
and on the other hand, the model of natural selection is being applied to the 
society: the societies that are “color”-conscious in their choices are more “fit” 
than others, and so survive.  
However, considering the broad extent of human history, the option of an 
individual “choosing” his or her mate has not been uniformly granted, and in 
particular, has more often not been granted to women; fathers or tribal elders 
typically control the reproductive options for women and girls.  Moreover, 
women have been regularly used in the context of gift-exchange between 
“foreign”, even hostile, groups as a means of increasing the chance of friendly 
relations (Rubin 1975), not to mention a way of expanding the gene pool. 
So much more would need to be said to support Outlaw’s suggestions that in- 12
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dividuals naturally choose mates who are marked as being the same “color”, 
for the alleged “choice” of mates is plausibly accounted for by a broad range 
of social facts rather than any biological predisposition on the part of indi-
viduals.15    And given the potential value of out-group mating (as evidenced 
by the practices of gift-exchange), more is also needed to support the claim 
that in-group mating is the most successful strategy.  
A further concern is whether, even if the choice of a same-“color” mate is 
common, and even if to some extent “natural,” whether this is good.  Outlaw 
suggests that it is valuable because it promotes the survival of the “life-world” 
of the community.  But of course, not all “life-worlds” are ones that should be 
preserved, even within a “liberal democratic society”.  For example, Outlaw 
speaks of the “valorization of descent” as a factor that contributes to the 
uniformity of “color” in a population, and also which also serves as a means 
of promoting cooperation between members of the population.  Setting 
aside the empirical question of whether this is an effective way to promote 
cooperation, it would seem that the valorization of descent would (and does) 
create an unjust hierarchy of family forms.   The history of adoption provides 
a rather gruesome tale of the effects of the “valorization of descent”: orphaned 
and “illegitimate” children are systematically abandoned, women who give 
birth to “illegitimate” children are cast out, even murdered, if discovered; 
parentless and adopted children through history have been mistreated, denied 
legal protections, and severely stigmatized.  Families that are formed through 
(either formal or informal) adoption are very often not regarded as “real” with 
the implication (among many others) that individuals and couples who want 
children nevertheless remain childless and leave children without homes, 
rather than face the stigma of adoption.   This suggests that the “valorization 
of descent” should be rejected in a “liberal democratic society”, not preserved.
In summary, it appears that “color” may in some hypothetical contexts 
and by accident be morally significant.  But this is not sufficient reason to 
treat race like gender as a response to a physical fact that even a just society 
must address.  Although both “color” and sex as we know them are socially 
significant, “color” need not, and in most cases, should not be.  However, thus 
far I’ve supposed that if “color” does impose constraints on what can be just, 
it would be due to the biological basis of “color”.  Are there other aspects of 
“color” that might legitimately constrain us?
III.  “COLOR” AND CULTURE
It is hard to imagine any function essential to a society that could only be 
served by distinguishing people along the lines of “color”.16    So it does not 
appear that an argument for treating “race” as a genus of social categories 
that includes both hierarchical and non-hierarchal forms, analogous to the 
argument offered for gender, is available.  But given the purposes of an engaged 
feminist antiracism, it is important to know not only what sorts of idealized 
societies there might be, but what a just society would look like that could 
plausibly evolve as a successor to ours.  One might argue, for example, that 
racial groups, although originating as offshoots of racist practices and policies, 13
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develop cultural forms and self-understandings that are valuable.  It might 
seem, more specifically, that a society without race couldn’t plausibly evolve 
from ours without cutting itself off from its own history and doing damage to 
meaningful communities.  Linda Alcoff argues in her paper, “Mestizo Identity:”
...within the context of racially based and organized systems of op-
pression, racial identity will continue to be a salient internal and 
external component of identity.  Systems of oppression, segregated 
communities, and practices of discrimination create a collective 
experience and a shared history for a racialized grouping.  It is 
that shared experience and history, more than any physiological 
or morphological features, that cements the community and cre-
ates connections with others along racial lines.  And that history 
cannot be deconstructed by new scientific accounts that dispute 
the characterization of race as a natural kind.  Accounts of race 
as a social and historical identity, though this brings in elements 
that are temporally contingent and mutable, will probably prove to 
have more persistence than accounts of race that tie it to biology.  
Ironically history will probably have more permanence than biology. 
(Alcoff 1995, 272)
Here Alcoff suggests that race might be best understood as “a social and historical 
identity”, and that race is more meaningfully centered on “shared experience 
and history” than on body type.  
The suggestion that racial unity stems more from shared experience and 
history is especially significant as we move away from the “Black-White binary” 
and think more carefully about the racialization of Latina/os and Asians.   For 
example, Latinas/os do not fit many of the assumptions typically made about 
races.   Latin America is highly diverse in the “color” of its populations and 
the cultures it includes:
By U.S. categories, there are black, brown, white, Asian and Native 
American Latinas/os.  There are many Latinas/os from the southern 
cone whose families are of recent European origin, a large number 
of Latinas/os from the western coastal areas whose families came 
from Asia, and of course a large number of Latinas/os whose lineage 
is entirely indigenous to the Americas or entirely African.  (Alcoff 
2000b, 31)
Moreover, the cultures of Cuba, Brazil, Panama, Mexico, Chile, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, to name a few, vary widely in their dominant (and regional) languages, 
cuisine, holidays, political structures, and virtually every other dimension of 
culture.  Comparable diversity can be found in Asia.  (And it should not be 
forgotten that there is tremendous cultural diversity in all of major groups 
racialized in the US, e.g., the cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa and the African 
Diaspora are by no means homogeneous.)  This is, of course, compatible with 
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Latinas/os and Asians being racialized in the United States.  
Such diversity of appearance and culture raises the question whether there 
is anything other than being racialized that unifies Latinas/os and Asians. 
Although racial identity has been imposed by systems of oppression, there are 
and have been movements within the groups to construct positive identities 
(pan-Latina/o, pan-Asian) to counter stigmatized identities and fight against 
the injustices inherent in the process of racialization.17    Do these count as 
“racial” identities?  Should we reconceive the notion of racial group in their 
terms?  Should a feminist antiracism support the formation of racial identities 
and racial groups in this sense?
A.  History, experience, and self-interpretation
One goal of this inquiry is to provide an account of race and racial identity 
that will be useful in the quest for social justice.  As Alcoff suggests, this will 
be to a significant extent a constructive project requiring us to look not only 
back to history but also forward towards a better future.  In developing my 
accounts of race and gender I have focused on the task of identifying groups 
who have suffered from certain forms of embodied oppression; we should not 
ignore, however, that the members of these groups are not passive victims, but 
are agents engaged in the construction of their own meanings (Lugones and 
Spelman 1986).   For  members of subordinated races, their racial affiliation—
as it has been constructed from within the group—is often not only a source 
of pride and value in their lives, but has provided resources to combat racial 
oppression.  So if we are thinking about the possible future of race, one option 
is to build on these positive racial reconstructions, rather than the damaging 
structures of oppression. 
For example, amongst those working on reconstructions of “Blackness”, 
one theme emphasized is shared history as opposed to “color”, and cultural 
inter-connections as opposed to common culture  (Gilroy 1993; Hall 1992; 
Gooding-Williams 1998).  This option is also considered by those working on 
Latina/o and Asian identity (Gracia 2000a; Gracia 2000b; Alcoff 2000; Shah 
1994), though as suggested above, the prospects of finding a plausible way to 
characterize the historical and cultural connections are diminished as the group 
becomes more diverse.  Moreover, insofar as a reconstruction of race in terms 
of history and experience will have to provide an interpretation of that history 
and experience, and so select what aspects to highlight, we re-encounter the 
problem of normativity.
One of the arguments that has been used to challenge the usefulness of the 
category of gender for feminist politics raises the concern that women are so 
diverse that there is no way to capture what women are that does not privilege 
some women as paradigmatic and others marginal.  This is a not merely an 
abstract concern in the context of women’s studies, for there have been strands 
of feminist research that focus on White privileged women as if their issues and 
experiences are representative of all women.  In developing my own account 
of gender I argued that theoretically privileging certain features of a group or 
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certain members of a group over others is not always pernicious, if the basis 
for privileging is justified by a legitimate purpose of the theory.  In the case 
of feminist research, one legitimate purpose is to develop a framework that 
enables us to identify and better understand forms of injustice.  Because my 
theory defines women as those who suffer from sex-based oppression, it the-
oretically privileges oppressed females.  But this is justified given the purpose 
of the inquiry.
I suggested that an analogous argument might also hold for race.  For example, 
there is a danger in determining what history and experiences should count as 
definitive of Blackness, or of Asianness, that a narrative would be constructed 
that privileges men, heterosexuals, the economically advantaged, the educated, 
etc.  The suggestion that reconstructed races would be defined by those who 
are its members is, if we imagine it happening through some highly democratic 
process, one strategy of addressing this concern (Gooding-Williams, 1988). 
However, even democracy doesn’t guarantee equitable inclusion.  Given that 
the effects of such efforts are not merely symbolic, but also have substantial 
ramifications in law and politics, there is reason to be extremely cautious.  It 
may be possible to provide a positive reconstruction of race or of particular 
races; my point here is to highlight the challenge of simultaneously accommo-
dating the broad diversity of people who count as members of a race, and the 
selectivity involved in constructing a basis for group membership.
I agree with Alcoff that there are a variety of groups unified by social/historical 
background and/or culture, and these are valuable and are likely to persist.  In 
the case of panethnicities, their formation and self-definition is still in progress. 
If we build on the positive reconstructions of race to envision the future of 
race, then we might pursue Alcoff’s  suggestion that the future of race lies in 
panethnicities, or what she calls (following David Goldberg) ethnoraces, that 
are unified around the history of being racialized as a group and the positive 
cultural forms that have evolved in response.  
B.  Ethnorace
What exactly is an “ethnorace”?  I’ve argued that there is a conception of race 
in terms of racialized group that is valuable for thinking about certain forms of 
embodied oppression.  This is how I characterized it in section I:
A group is racialized (in context C) iffdf its members are socially 
positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.) (in C), and the group is 
“marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a 
certain geographical region.
How is an ethnonrace different from a race?  Is the notion of an ethnorace 
more useful than race (as I’ve defined it)?   In considering a more just future, 
should we aspire to preserve ethnoraces or eliminate them and the conditions 
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that sustain them?  
Alcoff introduces the notion of ethnorace because social and historical 
reality does not seem to fit the standard classifications of race or ethnicity.  For 
example, Latina/os as a group are not racially homogenous, although Latina/o 
(or Hispanic) in many contexts counts as a race.  Some have suggested that 
a better strategy is to replace racial classification with ethnic classification. 
Ethnicities, as Alcoff is using the term, concern “cultural practices, customs, 
language, sometimes religion, and so on.” (Alcoff 2000, 25)  Some ethnicities, 
in this sense, are sub-groups of existing races (all of the standard races include 
various ethnic groups); and some ethnicities cross racial lines.
Alcoff recommends that we think of currently racialized groups (perhaps 
especially groups such as “Latina/os”) in terms of ethnoraces rather than 
ethnicities for three main reasons18 : (i) culture, especially the cultures of 
racialized groups, tends to be naturalized and to entail membership in a race. 
For example, as soon as one reveals information about one’s culture of origin, 
one is immediately racialized.  If one has grown up in Mexico and is culturally 
Mexican, then regardless of how one physically appears, one is assumed to 
be Latina/o.  (Alcoff 2000, 37-8)  (ii) the racial coding of the body trumps 
cultural identification:
…race, unlike ethnicity, has historically worked through visible mark-
ers on the body that trump dress, speech, and cultural practices….in 
popular consciousness—in the implicit perceptual practices we use 
in everyday life to discern how to relate to each other—ethnicity 
does not “replace” race.  When ethnic identities are used instead 
of racial ones, the perceptual practices of visual demarcation by 
which we slot people into racial categories continue to operate 
because ethnic categories offer no substituting perceptual practice.  
(Alcoff 2000, 38)
Because current social perception is conditioned to interpret “color” as cultur-
ally meaningful, classifications of individuals into ethnic groups will continue 
to rely on the physical markers of race.  And (iii) positive group solidarity 
amongst currently racialized groups in the United States is likely to provoke 
anxiety and resistance because the long history of their subordination is a threat 
to the dominant American self-image.  Insofar as the United States identifies 
with and takes pride in its commitment to equality and freedom for all, the 
affirmation of Otherness is a reminder of a shameful history that many long to 
erase. (Alcoff 2000, 39).  Because racialization has been rhetorically crucial to 
the legitimizing narratives of white supremacy, deracialization will be resisted.
So because race and racialization is intimately bound up with culture and 
so ethnicity, Alcoff recommends ethnorace:
Unlike race, ethnorace does not imply a common descent, which 
is precisely what tends to embroil race in notions of biological 
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determinism and natural and heritable characteristics.  Ethnorace 
might have the advantage of bringing into play the elements of both 
human agency and subjectivity involved in ethnicity—that is, an 
identity that is the product of self-creation—at the same time that 
it acknowledges the uncontrolled racializing aspects associated with 
the visible body.  (Alcoff 2000, 42)
Although intriguing and suggestive, I’m not sure I have a firm grasp on 
the notion.  My best guess is that an ethnorace is a group of people who have 
been “marked” as of the same race (this is the uncontrolled racializing aspect), 
who share some common cultural elements and are collectively involved in 
the constitution of their shared identity.  Ethnorace differs from race, as I’ve 
defined race, in including the conditions of common culture and agency in 
the construction of identity.  Races, as I’ve characterized them, do not require 
any commonality in culture, commitment, or identity.  They only require that 
members are similarly positioned structurally in society, whether they want 
to be or not, whether they even notice this or not.  Races are more ascribed 
than embraced.  However, plausibly Alcoff’s ethnoraces count as a subset of 
races in my sense: if races are groups whose “color” affects their social position, 
ethnoraces are those among them that have developed a common culture and 
a commitment to shared identity.  Some, but not all, races are ethnoraces.
Alcoff offers the notion of ethnorace not as a vision of the groups that should 
be part of a utopian future, but as a reconstruction of the notion of race that 
applies to (some of) us now and what the next step in the elimination of race 
might look like.  I would assume that in a context where racialization is long 
past, ethnorace could be replaced by ethnicity.  In effect, not only the condition 
of common descent, but also the practice of “color” marking would disappear. 
Are ethnoraces a valuable interim category?  This is controversial.  I take it 
that Alcoff (and others) encourage the formation of ethnoraces because they 
highlight and encourage agency in group formation and acknowledge some 
degree of common subjectivity amongst those who are similarly racialized. 
Others, however, will urge us to resist racism by rejecting membership in 
“color”-defined groups, and resisting identities formed around “color”.  I prefer 
not to take a stand on this normative issue.  In any case, we have reason to be 
theoretically attentive to the formation of such groups as we trace the workings 
of racializing practices and active resistance to them.  
However, I believe that we also need to maintain a conception of race or 
racialized group that is not as concerned with culture or agency.  For example, 
internationally adopted children of color who are brought up in the United 
States are ethnically American; often if they are adopted transracially they are 
not involved in the self-creation of an ethnic identity associated with their 
birthcountry, or even a panethnic identity.  And yet they are raced; they don’t 
become the race  or ethnorace of their adoptive parents. (See also Corlett 2000, 
227; Corlett 1999)  At least we need some way of including such adoptees 
within the racialized group they are taken to belong to in order to understand 
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some of the injustices they face in the United States.
Moreover, although it is clear that ethnicity is racialized, race is also “ethni-
cized” in problematic ways.  Alcoff herself points out that because she is Latina, 
she is assumed to enjoy spicy food, even though in Panama (her ancestral home) 
the food is mild.  (Alcoff 2000, 33)  Racial stereotypes that allegedly capture 
“cultural” differences abound (Blacks enjoy basketball, Asians value education). 
In the context of adoption, a link between race and culture has been a site of 
controversy for decades.  In the 1950’s, internationally adopted children were 
forced to assimilate and were allowed to have little, if anything, to do with the 
culture of their birthcountry.  By the early 1970’s, transracial adoption (both 
domestic and international) was challenged for, among other things, denying 
a child “her” culture.  By the 1990’s when international adoption boomed and 
domestic transracial adoption began to significantly increase, the pressure on 
adoptive parents to become educated in the child’s culture and to provide 
“cultural competence” in this culture to the child, remained very strong (in 
some cases being written into policies determining who could adopt).  There 
is a way of seeing this as an enforcement of ethnorace.19     Such practices are, 
I believe, at odds with Alcoff’s recommendations.  However, they alert us to 
both concerns about the normative import of the category of ethnorace and 
also the need for a category that allows us to keep race and ethnicity apart.
IV.  CONCLUSION
I recommend that we opt for the account of race that I’ve proposed as useful 
for doing the work of identifying those affected by racialization and remedying 
its harms.  I further propose that we employ the notions of culture, ethnicity, 
panethnicity, and ethnorace, for understanding the more constructive efforts to 
form new identities that do justice to our histories and our experiences.   This 
proposal leaves open the possibility that currently racialized groups will either 
form a more encompassing identities describable in terms of shared history 
and experience (a pan-Latina/o identity) or will retain a variety of more local 
identities (Puerto-Rican, Brazilian, Cuban-American, Chicana/o). 
I have argued (though the argument is far from conclusive) that in the long 
run, social justice does not require the formation or maintenance of groups 
defined by “color”, though “color”-based groups may be valuable as part of an 
interim strategy.   Race, as I’ve proposed we understand it, is something to be 
rid of.  Ethnicity or ethnorace, if understood as involving both “color” and 
culture may be helpful in the short term, but I believe that an ongoing social 
investment in “color” is harmful.  In short, “after the revolution” we should 
anticipate that there will be no men and women, but there will be males and 
females (and herms, merms, ferms, etc.), and these sexual differences will have 
distinct but egalitarian implications.  And although, we should hope, people 
will come in the broad variety of skin tones, shapes, and appearances they do 
now and will organize themselves around a rich array of cultural practices, 
there will be no races.  Although from the point of view of justice, it would 
be irresponsible not to accord differences between our bodies some social 
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meaning, it would also be irresponsible not to overturn the meanings we now 
assume to be natural and right.  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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NOTES
 1  Much of the material presented in this section can be found in more fully developed 
form in (Haslanger 2000). Thanks to Lawrence Blum, Jorge Garcia, Koffi Maglo, 
Ishani Maitra, Tommie Shelby, and Stephen Yablo for helpful discussion of the 
issues discussed here.
 2 As we saw above, the everyday distinction between males and females leaves out 
the intersexed population that might have been given its own sex category (or 
categories); so it may be appropriate to introduce terms for additional sexes, e.g., 
‘merms’, ‘ferms’, and ‘herms’ (Fausto-Sterling 1993).  A study of the construction of 
sex—meaning the genealogy of sex categories—is itself an interesting and valuable 
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project (Laqueur 1990; Fausto-Sterling 2000), but it is not my focus here.
 3  It is by no means a simple question what criteria should be used to distinguish 
different sexes.  Sexologists such as John Money have argued that there are ten 
indicators of sex including: chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, fetal hormonal sex, 
internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, brain sex, sex assignment and 
rearing, pubertal hormonal sex, gender identity and role, procreative sex.  (Faus-
to-Sterling 1995).  Clearly, not all of these indicators are anatomical.  However, as 
I will be using the term, sex primarily concerns anatomy.  Additional sex-related 
characteristics, femininity, feminine identity, etc. go beyond sex towards gender.
 4  Some theorists (Delphy 1984) focus on the economic exploitation of women in 
domestic relations of production; others (Wittig 1981; Wittig 1982) focus on sexual 
and reproductive exploitation under compulsory heterosexuality; others (MacKinnon 
1987) focus on sexual objectification.
 5  This is a simplified version of the account I offer in (Haslanger 2000).
 6 These analyses allow that there isn’t a common understanding of “sex” across time 
and place.  On my account, gendered social positions are those marked by reference 
to features that are generally assumed in the context in question to either explain 
or provide evidence of reproductive role, whether or not these are features that we 
consider “sex”.
 7 On this I am deeply indebted to (Stevens 1999, Ch. 4), and (Omi and Winant 1994, 
esp. pp. 53-61). I develop this definition more fully in (Haslanger 2000).
 8 As in the case of gender, I recommend that we view membership in a racial/ethnic 
group in terms of how one is viewed and treated regularly and for the most part in 
the context in question; though as before, one could distinguish being a member of 
a given race from functioning as one by considering the degree of one’s entrench-
ment in the racialized social position (not on the basis of biology or ancestry).  For 
more work that compares race and gender, see (Thomas 1980, Appiah 1990, Corlett 
1997).
 9  For more on “thin” and “thick” identities, see (Haslanger 2003).
 10 It should also be part of that project to identify those reproductive (and potentially 
also erotic) differences that should be taken into account in order to achieve justice, 
i.e., in identifying legitimate sexual/sexuality differences.
 11 Note that there are several different questions at issue.  Considering a just future 
when the effects of contemporary racialization have been remedied:    i)  Must the 
state, in its laws and policies, be “color-blind” or is attention to “color” differences 
required for justice?  ii)  Must we eliminate “color” categories in our social practices 
and our self-understandings in order to achieve justice? iii) Is there something so-
cially valuable in “color” classification, and would its  elimination destroy something 
valuable?  iv) Even if not required for justice, would the elimination of “color” as a 
way of organizing ourselves socially be better overall?  It may be helpful to rethink 
the discussion that follows with a greater attention to these different questions.
 12 Note that even though there is controversy over whether races are biologically 
meaningful categories, there is general consensus on the claim that “color” dis-
tinctions do not track biologically meaningful categories except to the extent that 
“color” takes on a meaning that has social implications.
 13 For a useful discussion of related issues, see (Wasserstrom 1987; also Gotanda 1995).
 14 This claim puzzles me: not only is it asserted without evidence (the nuclear family 
is, in fact, a relatively recent and socially specific phenomenon!), but it would seem 
that if one reproduces biologically, one cannot avoid having a child who looks 
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like you, to some extent.  Perhaps the idea is that because “looks like” is socially 
defined, one is in danger of not passing on the socially salient features if one mates 
with an out-group member.
 15 There is reason to believe, in any case, that for many populations geographical 
isolation made it difficult not to mate primarily with others of the same “color”; is 
there any evidence that when a variety of “colors” are available, and there are no 
social sanctions, there is a preference for in-group mates?
 16 What about health policy?  Are there racially specific diseases or vulnerabilities that 
might make it important to have different health care options for people of different 
races?  Are the explanations of the differences socio-economic or biological?  Is 
there a basis for a parallel to the argument for gender here?
 17 For example, Simón Bolívar, José Martí, and Che Guevara have promoted a 
pan-Latina/o solidarity (Alcoff 2000b, 27).  There have also been moves, especially 
amongst feminists of color, to embrace mixed identity, e.g., (Anzaldúa 1987, Zack 
1993, Zack 1995).
 18 She also provides reasons for not thinking of Latinas/os as a race.  On this see also 
(Mendieta 2000).
 19 I agree that it is extremely important for transracially adopted children to be given 
the resources to develop positive self-esteem and to combat the racism they will 
confront.  And in some cases this will involve building a connection to a community 
of people of the same race.  However, my concern is that the argument for such 
involvement is often based on the idea that by virtue of having a race the child 
already has a culture; on this view, transracial adoption is inherently problematic 
because it uproots a child from her culture.  (Cf. Allen 1993)
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